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The Case Against Judicialization of the WTO Dispute Settlement System
I.

Introduction
The change from General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1 to the World Trade

Organization (WTO)2 is often described as a shift from a largely diplomacy-based or negotiated
apparatus for dispute resolution to a more rules-based or adjudicatory model.3 At the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations in 1994, the member states of the GATT established
the WTO and established a more robust and reliable procedure for the resolution of disputes
among member states.4 During the negotiations, much of the debate focused on the need for a
more judicialized, rule-oriented approach to take the place of the negotiation-based system under
the GATT.5 Through “judicialization,” trade relations become increasingly regulated by norms
and enforcement procedures that are legal in character.6

1

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATT].
2
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Legal Instruments--Results
of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement or WTO
Agreement].
3
See Robert E. Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law, The Evolution of the Modern
GATT Legal System, 138-150 (1993); William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in
GATT, 11 Fordham Int.L.J. 51, 67-78 (1987).
4
Timothy Stostad, Trappings of Legality: Judicialization of Dispute Settlement in the WTO, and
Its Impact on Developing Countries, 39 Cornell Int'l L.J. 811, 811 (2006).
5
Id. Some call this process “juridicization” (see Arie Reich, From Diplomacy to Law: The
Juridicization of International Trade Relations, 17 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 775 (1997)).
“Legalization” is also used for increasing role of law and rules in the settlement process (see
Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political
Constraints, 98 Am. J. Int'l L. 247 (2004)).
6
Arie Reich, From Diplomacy to Law: The Juridicization of International Trade Relations, 17
Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 775, 776 (1997)).
1

The WTO dispute settlement system is now said to function very much like a court of
international trade.7 The Marrakesh Agreement makes dispute resolution through the Dispute
Settlement Understanding (DSU)8 as one of the five key functions of the WTO.9 There is
compulsory jurisdiction; disputes are settled largely by applying rules of law; decisions are
binding upon the parties; and sanctions may be imposed if decisions are not observed.10 Other
court-like characteristics include an automatic right of appellate review and practically automatic
binding of the dispute settlement decisions on the parties.11
In the recent years, the Appellate Body has further judicialized the dispute settlement
system through judicial lawmaking by filling the gaps left by the DSU’s silence, giving specific
meaning to ambiguous treaty language, and cumulatively reading language across the GATT and
the WTO agreements. While it is widely accepted that the initial judicialization of trade dispute
resolution with the DSU was generally beneficial for international trade, whether procedural and
substantive judicial lawmaking would benefit the international trade system is still debated.12
The Appellate Body should limit its judicialization through judicial lawmaking. While
judicial lawmaking to make the WTO dispute settlement process resemble state court systems
7

Thomas Schoenbaum, WTO Dispute Settlement: Praise and Suggestions for Reform, 47 Int'l &
Comp. L.Q. 647, 648 (1998).
8
See generally Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2,
Legal Instruments--Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
9
Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 2, art. III:4.
10
Thomas Schoenbaum, WTO Dispute Settlement: Praise and Suggestions for Reform, 47 Int'l
& Comp. L.Q. 647, 648 (1998).
11
GATT, supra note 1. The decisions are practically always binding because the Marrakesh
Agreement requires negative consent rule, which will be discussed later in this paper.
12
I call both additional procedures and additional substantive obligations by judicial lawmaking
as “judicialization” in this paper. The line between procedural and substantive law is not always
clear, and judicial lawmaking’s role of changing the trade dispute system to be more rule-based
and adjudicative is more or less the same. Additional cost for making and defending claims for
developing countries, violation of sovereignty, and lack of democratic controls are similarly
implicated.
2

may theoretically bring objective dispute decisions independent from world politics and benefit
the developing countries, the effects of procedural judicial lawmaking actually may harm
developing countries with higher costs resulting from more complex litigation system. The
judicialization through judicial lawmaking also lacks legitimacy, as it undermines national
sovereignty and lacks any democratic controls.

II.

Judicialization of the WTO Dispute Settlement Process
According to Yasuhei Taniguchi, a former member of the Appellate Body of WTO,

today’s reality shows increasing “judicialization” of the dispute settlement.13 Small states can
win against economic and political giant like the United States and EU in trade disputes, unlike
the case in diplomacy.14 He compares the WTO dispute process to state court litigation.15
The DSU has incorporated many formal procedures to trade dispute settlement process,
since the dispute settlement process under the GATT was criticized for the lack of such
procedural rules – no fixed timetable for resolution of disputes, making the system very
susceptible to delaying tactics; no automatic establishment a panel upon filing of a complaint; no
notification requirement for implementation of a panel recommendation; and requirement of
consensus for adoption of a panel recommendation, which allowed the losing party to veto a
panel's ruling to prevent it from gaining force.16 With its lack of procedural formality, GATT

13

Yasuhei Taniguchi, The WTO Dispute Settlement As Seen by A Proceduralist, 42 Cornell Int'l
L.J. 1, 20 (2009) (citing Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Multilevel Judicial Governance of
International Trade Requires a Common Conception of Rule of Law and Justice, 10 J. Int'l Econ.
L. 529, 531 & n.5 (2007)).
14
Id.
15
Id. at 2.
16
Timonthy Stostad, supra note 4, at 816. The losing parties under GATT however seldom used
their veto because their long-term interest in having a stable forum for dispute resolution
generally outweighed their interest in maintaining a particular trade barrier.
3

“was essentially a small ‘club’ of like-minded trade officials who had been working together
since the . . . ITO negotiations,” and therefore “did not need an elaborate decision-making
procedure to generate an effective consensus. . . .”17 As membership in GATT grew, there was
more need for procedural formality, and then came the DSU.18 The WTO legal system now
consists of substantive law rules and procedural (court organization) rules.19 Substantive law and
rules for international trade are contained in various multilateral treaties.20 Procedural and
organizational rules are embodied in the DSU.21

A. Court-like Process
The WTO dispute settlement process is similar to that of civil litigation.22 Both processes
involve adversarial proceedings between the complaining party and the defending party, with a
neutral decisionmaker presiding. The complaining party must present a case with supporting
legal arguments and evidence, and the defending party has a full opportunity to rebut the
allegations.23 The panel has the right to seek necessary information.24 In practice and by
necessity, the panels exercise this power only to supplement the information set forth by the
party-states' complaints and rebuttals.25 Due to the similarities between the WTO process and
national litigation, one would naturally expect to find many procedural issues in the WTO

17

Id. (citing Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of
the First Three Years, 8 Minn. J. Global Trade 1, 5-6 (1999)).
18
Id.
19
Yasuhei Taniguchi, supra note 13, at 2.
20
Id. Taniguchi lists “Anti-Dumping Agreement, “Subsidy Agreement,” and “SPS Agreement”
as examples of such treaties.
21
Id.
22
Id., at 9.
23
Id.
24
DSU art. 13.
25
Yasuhei Taniguchi, supra note 13, at 9 (2009).
4

process which also commonly arise in national litigation, such as the required degree of
specificity in a complaint and issues relating to evidence--i.e., burden of proof, treatment of
confidential information, and questions relating to fact and law.26 These issues may or may not
be amenable to the same treatment they receive in national courts.27

B. Compulsory Enforcement and Jurisdiction
Key features of the WTO DSU that demonstrate the Appellate Body’s unique place as an
international institution are its compulsory enforcement and jurisdiction. The WTO dispute
settlement system’s increased independence from the influence of the world politics comes from
the adoption of “negative consensus rule,” embodied in articles 16.4 and 17.14 of the DSU.28
Unless DSB members form a consensus against the adoption of a report, the DSB must adopt the
report.29 Since winning state can prevent such consensus from forming, a negative consensus is
difficult to form in practice, and no report has been rejected.30 The adoption of all of DSB reports
makes DSB appear to be independent decisionmakers similar to national courts in modern
states.31
The WTO’s dispute settlement system also resembles a national judiciary because of its
compulsory jurisdiction.32 In national court systems, one can sue someone, and the defendant has
no choice but to respond or suffer a default judgment. The national court’s power to decide does
26

Id.
Id.
28
Id., at 5.
29
See DSU arts. 16.4, 17.14.
30
Yasuhei Taniguchi, supra note 13, at 5. As of April 24, 2015, 187 panel reports and 117
Appellate Body reports have been adopted
(http://www.worldtradelaw.net/databases/wtopanels.php;
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/databases/abreports.php).
31
Id.
32
Id.
27

5

not depend on the defendant's consent to submit to jurisdiction. The same rule applies in the
WTO system. The WTO forms a panel that starts working without the consent or agreement of
the respondent state.33 Such compulsory jurisdiction differs from many other international legal,
adjudicative institutions such as the International Court of Justice, where a binding judgment can
be rendered only if there is an agreement of the party-states to submit a dispute to the Court.34
Some argue that the judicialization of WTO dispute settlement system is not complete
because of the weak enforceability of an adopted report.35 Enforcement of an adopted DSB
report is not possible in the same way as a judgment of a state court, as WTO’s agreed methods
of enforcement are modest and are not strong enough to cope with WTO’s recalcitrant noncompliance.36 The losing party may pretend to comply without bringing effective change in their
trade policy, and the winning party only has retaliatory trade restrictions as a countermeasure.
This countermeasure can amount to almost nothing if the winning party is a small trading
country. However, the weak enforceability alone does not disprove the general judicialization of
the WTO dispute settlement system. This shortcoming can be accepted as the ultimate limitation
of today’s international society.37 Taniguchi aptly notes, “there is no king of the village.” 38
DSU’s mild, indirect coercion is still regarded as a remarkable innovation in public international
law.39

33

Id. (citing Cesare P.R. Romano, The Shift from the Consensual to the Compulsory Paradigm
in International Adjudication: Elements for a Theory of Consent, 39 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol.
791, 812 (2007)).
34
Id.
35
Id., at 7.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id. Taniguchi discusses the retaliatory action under DSU Article 22 as the most effective
measure of enforcement. Although local political conditions make countries comply with DSB
recommendations, no losing member state ever openly declared that it would not comply.
6

III.

The Process of Judicialization: WTO Appellate Body’s Judicial Lawmaking
Even after the DSU, the trade dispute settlement system continued to judicialize through

the Appellate Body’s judicial lawmaking. The Appellate Body engages in further judicialization
by creating laws that fill in the procedural gaps left by the DSU’s silence.40 For example, in U.S.- Shrimp/Turtle I,41 the Appellate Body decided that dispute settlement panels could consider
amicus curiae briefs submitted by nonstate actors by relying on the general language in DSU
Article 13.42 The provision provides that a panel may “seek information and technical advice
from any individual or body it deems appropriate.”43 Similarly, in EC—Bananas III,44 the
Appellate Body established that private lawyers may represent members in oral proceedings,
despite EC and U.S. opposition on the ground that the practice had been to permit exclusively
government lawyers or government trade experts’ presentations in dispute settlement
proceedings.45 The Appellate Body reasoned that nothing in the WTO agreements, customary
international law, or the “prevailing practice of international tribunals . . . prevents a WTO
Member from determining the composition of its delegation in Appellate Body proceedings.”46
Participation by nongovernment lawyers was first adopted in Indonesia--Autos.47

40

Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the Wto: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political
Constraints, 98 Am. J. Int'l L. 247, 251 (2004).
41
United States--Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc.
WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Nov. 6, 1998), reprinted in 38 ILM 118 (1999) [hereinafter U.S.-Shrimp/Turtle I].
42
Richard H. Steinberg, supra note 40.
43
DSU, art. 13.
44
European Communities--Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WTO
Doc. WT/DS27/AB/R, paras. 5-10 (adopted Sept. 25, 1997), excerpted in 37 ILM 243
(1998) [hereinafter EC--Bananas].
45
Richard H. Steinberg, supra note 40.
46
Id., at 251-52; EC--Bananas, para. 10.
47
Richard H. Steinberg, supra note 40, at 252; Indonesia--Certain Measures Affecting the
Automobile Industry, WTO Doc. WT/DS54/R, paras. 4.1-4.35 (adopted July 23, 1998)
[hereinafter Indonesia--Autos].
7

The WTO Appellate Body engages in lawmaking also by giving specific meaning to
ambiguous treaty language. 48 For example, in U.S.--Shrimp/Turtle I, the Appellate Body had to
decide whether the U.S. could rely on GATT Article XX(g) to ban the importation of certain
shrimp and shrimp products from members that did not maintain laws requiring particular
methods of protecting endangered sea turtles while fishing for shrimp.49 GATT Article XX(g)
excepts certain measures from the GATT's affirmative obligations if they are necessary for the
“conservation of exhaustible natural resources,” but the provision is ambiguous through silence
on whether such exhaustible natural resources must be located within the jurisdiction of the
country invoking the exception.50 The Appellate Body concluded that the conditions for GATT
Article XX(g) exception must be read “in the light of contemporary concerns of the community
of nations about the protection and conservation of the environment.”51 The Appellate Body also
interpreted the chapeau of Article XX after concluding that the U.S. measures fell within Article
XX(g) exceptions and established factors that would apply in considering whether a measure
contravened the terms of the chapeau.52 Some of the factors had no textual lineage.53
Lastly, the Appellate Body has read language across GATT/WTO agreements
cumulatively in a way that has generated an expansive set of legal obligations.54 In U.S--Lamb

48

Richard H. Steinberg, , supra note 40, at 252.
Id.
50
Id.
51
U.S.--Shrimp/Turtle I, supra note 41, para. 129.
52
Id.
53
Id. Steinberg points out “intended and actual coercive effect on the specific policy decisions
made by foreign governments” from U.S.--Shrimp/Turtle I, para. 161 as an example of such
factor.
54
Id., at 253.
49

8

Meat 55 and Argentina-- Footwear,56 the Appellate Body ruled that national authorities imposing
a safeguard measure must demonstrate the existence of “unforeseen developments” even though
the WTO Agreement on Safeguards57 makes no reference to a requirement to demonstrate
unforeseen developments, as a result of the negotiators’ express consideration and rejection of
the inclusion of such requirement. 58 GATT panels did not require “unforeseen developments”
since GATT decision in U.S.--Hatters' Fur case in 1952, as broad interpretation of the
“unforeseen developments” could allow any events, such as unexpected change in consumer
tastes, to constitute unforeseen developments.59 The combination of GATT practice, relevant
texts, and negotiating history created an ambiguity over whether unforeseen developments must
be demonstrated in safeguard cases.60 Nevertheless, focusing on GATT Article XIX:1(a), the
Appellate Body read all of the relevant GATT/WTO law and practice cumulatively in a way that
led it to conclude that a demonstration of unforeseen developments must be shown if a safeguard
measure is to be applied.61
Judicial lawmaking has been possible because the Appellate Body has accorded great
weight to its past decisions even though stare decisis is not followed formally by international

55

United States--Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from
New Zealand and Australia, WTO Doc. WT/DS177/AB/R (adopted May 16, 2001) [hereinafter
U.S.-- Lamb Meat].
56
Argentina--Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear, WTO Doc. WT/DS121/AB/R
(adopted Jan. 12, 2000) [hereinafter Argentina--Footwear].
57
Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, in THE LEGAL
TEXTS, supra note 1, at 275.
58
Richard H. Steinberg, supra note 40, at 253.
59
Report on the Withdrawal by the United States of a Tariff Concession Under Article XIX of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT Doc. CP/106 (Nov. 10, 1951); see also John
H. Jackson, World Trade And The Law of GATT, 560-61 (1969).
60
Richard H. Steinberg, supra note 40, at 253.
61
Richard H. Steinberg, supra note 40, at 253-54.
9

tribunals.62 In public international law, past decisions may be persuasive but not binding.63
However, previous decisions and doctrine are so highly persuasive in WTO jurisprudence that
WTO may be said to observe de facto stare decisis.64 This practice is reinforced by the Appellate
Body's procedure of meeting en banc to discuss each case and ensure consistency across
decisions,65 although every decision rests with a three-member division of the Appellate Body.

IV.

Arguments Against Further Judicialization
A. Complex Procedures Deter Developing Countries’ Participation in the WTO
Dispute Settlement Process
Judicialization does bring benefits to the trade dispute settlement process. Judicialization

should advance the accountability, rationality, clarity, and stability of the DSB decisions.66 The
WTO Appellate Body has adopted detailed procedural rules for notices of appeal, specific
methods of submitting timely evidence, measures to avoid conflicts of interest for those hearing
cases, and has welcomed amicus briefs, giving a new avenue for participation in this critical

62

Richard H. Steinberg, supra note 40, at 254.
Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 1-29 (6th ed. 2003).
64
Richard H. Steinberg, supra note 40, at 254 (citing Raj Bhala, The Myth About Stare Decisis
and International Trade Law (Part One of a Trilogy), 14 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 845, 853 (1999);
Raj Bhala, The Precedent Setters: De Facto Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication (Part Two of a
Trilogy), 9 Fla. St. J. Transnat’l L. & Pol'y 1 (1999); Raj Bhala, The Power of the Past: Towards
de Jure Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication (Part Three of a Trilogy), 33 Geo. Wash. Int'l L.
Rev. 873, 910-13 (2001)).
65
Working Procedures for Appellate Review, WTO Doc. WT/AB/WP/4, para. 4(3) (Jan. 24,
2002) [hereinafter Working Procedures]; see also Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Six Years on the
Bench of the “World Trade Court”: Some Personal Experiences as Member of the Appellate
Body of the World Trade Organization, 36 J. World Trade 605, 612-13 (2002).
66
Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative
Law, 115 Yale L.J. 1490, 1496 (2006).
63

10

dimension of WTO rulemaking.67 The Appellate Body’s formalization of its procedures has
helped to build understanding about the rules of international trade, provide a check on WTO
policymaking, and promote real policy dialogue.68 The dispute settlement rules and procedures
have provided the organization with a reputation for fairness and rigor in upholding due process,
and thus greater procedural legitimacy.69
However, further judicialization, which yields increasingly complex procedural rules,
incurs more cost for developing countries to participate in the WTO dispute settlement process70
and undermines one of the judicialization’s main goals of empowering developing countries. 71
One of the potential benefits of de-politicization through judicialization is putting developing
countries that lack economic and political power on an equal footing with developed countries in
trade disputes.72 However, data reveals that the U.S. and E.C. have been the largest users of the
DSU, while developing countries still seldom invoke the DSU.73 The vastly increased
complexity of the substantive law, coupled with the more formal, quasi-judicial litigation
process, has imposed enormous costs on would-be users of the system, both in the pre-litigation
stage and during the litigation.74 As judicialization leads to more complex WTO dispute process,

67

Id., at 1546 (2006); Carrie Wofford, A Greener Future at the WTO: The Refinement of WTO
Jurisprudence on Environmental Exceptions to GATT, 24 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 563 (2000).
68
Daniel C. Esty, supra note 66, at 1546-47.
69
Daniel C. Esty, supra note 66, at 1547.
70
Adam S. Chilton & Ryan W. Davis, Equality, Procedural Justice, and the World Trade
Organization, 7 Intercultural Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 277, 310 (2012).
71
Don Moon, Equality and Inequality in the WTO Dispute Settlement (DS) System: Analysis of
the GATT/WTO Dispute Data, 32 Int'l Interactions 201, 202 (2006).
72
Adam S. Chilton & Ryan W. Davis, supra note 70, at 303-04.
73
Timothy Stostad, supra note 4, at 813.
74
Id.
11

successful dispute settlement depends more on a country's ability to muster considerable
economic and “human capital” resources of the kind developing countries typically lack.75
Developing countries suffer from human capital problem and cannot incur the cost
required in a more judicialized dispute process. A member state is likely to initiate a case in the
WTO dispute settlement system if the expected benefits of litigation exceed the expected cost,
where the expected benefit is the gain that would accrue to the exporter following successful
resolution of the dispute multiplied by the probability that the dispute will be resolved
successfully.76 Even before they deliberate whether to litigate, developing countries are much
less equipped to incur the cost to identify WTO-inconsistent measures.77 In both the public and
private sector, they tend to lack the domestic expertise necessary to identify these disputes.78
Developing countries are also simply unrepresented or underrepresented at the WTO in
Geneva,79 and litigating the disputes would incur significant cost on sophisticated legal talent. 80
Further judicialization of the dispute settlement that requires more human capital in evidence
gathering and representation at the WTO would raise barriers to dispute settlement that
disparately filter out developing countries and leave out those that de-politicization should

75

Id.
Chad P. Bown, Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement: Complaints, Interested Parties, and
Free Riders, 19:2 World Bank Econ. Rev. 287, 297 (2005).
77
See, e.g., Marc L. Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Testing International Trade Law: Empirical
Studies of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement, in The Political Economy of International Trade
Law: Essays in Honor of Robert E. Hudec, 457, 477 (Daniel L. M. Kennedy & James Southwick
eds., 2002); See generally Gregory C. Shaffer, Defending Interests: Public-Private Partnerships
in WTO Litigation (2003).
78
Chad P. Bown & Bernard M. Hoekman, WTO Dispute Settlement and the Missing Developing
Country Cases: Engaging the Private Sector, 8 J. Int'l Econ. L. 861, 871-72 (2005).
79
See generally Constantine Michalopoulos, The Developing Countries in the WTO, 22:1 World
Econ. 117 (1999).
80
Timothy Stostad, supra note 4, at 826.
76

12

benefit.81 Developing countries already suffer from the lack of retaliatory capacity against the
respondents, and the increased cost does not come with more benefit of enforcement.82 Decisions
under the WTO’s DSU do not impinge on member states in the way that the decisions of a
domestic court constrain citizens, as the enforcement comes from retaliatory measures or
reputational costs for noncompliance.83
Further judicialization could in fact have the opposite of its intended effect by “put[ing]
another arrow into the quiver of already powerful states” against the poor countries that lack the
technical legal expertise and financial resources to work within the WTO’s legal system.84 When
a developed country files a claim against a developing country, the developing country may not
be equipped to defend itself properly with further judicialization. Gregory Shaffer’s somber
finding shows that developing countries are less likely to file complaints under the WTO than
they were under GATT, while the percentage of cases targeting developing countries has risen
significantly.85 Only states with high capacity can use complicated legal-procedural rules for
their interest. 86 The gap in these members’ knowledge and expertise of the dispute settlement
process is widened, as some members regularly take part in litigation and gain invaluable
experience, while those who remain uninvolved do not.87

81

Id.
Id., at 827..
83
Adam S. Chilton & Ryan W. Davis, supra note 70, at 309 (2012)
84
Id., at 311.
85
Id. (citing Gregory Shaffer, How to Make the WTO Dispute Settlement System Work for
Developing Countries: Some Proactive Developing Country Strategies, 14 (ICTSD Resource
Paper No. 5, 2003)).
86
Id.
87
Amanda Bergstrom, Imbalance of Power: Procedural Inequities Within the Wto Dispute
Settlement System, 22 Pac. McGeorge Global Bus. & Dev. L.J. 93, 98 (2009).
82

13

B. Judicialization Through Judicial Lawmaking Lacks Legitimacy
The WTO dispute settlement system’s judicialization through the Appellate Body’s
judicial activism may also trigger concerns of violation of national sovereignty and lack of
democratic controls. The expansiveness of the WTO judicial lawmaking diminishes the
sovereignty of states or subvert the will of the national government by increasing their
obligations.88 John Ragosta, Navin Joneja, and Mikhail Zeldovich accuse the Appellate Body of
becoming an international tribunal that creates new obligations and imposes them on sovereign
nations in violation of specific provisions and sound concepts of international law
development.89 Through judicial activism, the Appellate Body may be abusing its binding nature
to create WTO “common law,” to which the member states never agreed.90 The terms of the
negotiated agreements could “evolve” into something that none of the original parties to the
agreements ever anticipated.91
At the same time, there is no functioning international governing system to control such
law-giving “courts” through “democratic” means of amending of laws, reversal of inappropriate
decisions, or fair appointment of judges.92 The generative lawmaking by the dispute settlement
system would be undemocratic, given the limited transparency and insularity of the process.93

88

See, e.g., Claude E. Barfield, Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy: The Future of the World
Trade Organization (2001).
89
John Ragosta, Navin Joneja, Mikhail Zeldovich, WTO Dispute Settlement: The System Is
Flawed and Must Be Fixed, 37 Int'l Law. 697, 698 (2003).
90
Alan Wm. Wolff & John A. Ragosta, How the Uruguay Round Will Change the Practice of
International Trade Law in the United States, in The World Trade Organization: Multilateral
Trade Framework for the 21st Century and U.S. Implementing Legislation, 697, 698 (Terrence P.
Stewart ed. 1996).
91
John Ragosta, Navin Joneja, Mikhail Zeldovich, supra note 89, at 707 (2003).
92
John A. Ragosta, Unmasking the WTO—Access to the DSB System: Can the WTO DSB Live
Up to the Moniker “World Trade Court”? 31 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 739, 741 (2000); Kal
Raustiala, Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 1 Chi. J. Int'l L. 401 (2000).
93
Kal Raustiala, supra note 92.
14

When a domestic court “makes law,” it is subject to review by the legislature, oversight, and
modification.94 The decision can be reversed by the legislature.95 Such protections are essential
parts of a democratic system but are lacking or ineffective in the WTO.96
Given national sovereignty violation and lack of democratic controls, binding dispute
resolution can undermine the negotiation process by chilling enthusiasm for major concessions.97
Further judicialization of the WTO is unlikely to offer tangible gains in trade liberalization in the
long run as it may lead powerful states to walk away from their obligations.98 Emphasizing the
negotiators’ need for exit options as safety valves and precondition for reaching consensus and
concluding new agreements, Joost Pauwelyn argues that drastically reducing or eliminating exit
options by instituting new obligations and further legalizing the WTO without countervailing
increases in participation, loyalty and support for the WTO project would risk undermining the
substantive commitment both to the WTO and to the DSU in particular.99 Overly expansive
judicial lawmaking may undermine the political support of powerful states for the WTO, which
could collapse the entire institution.100 Despite a conscious move toward legalization, the
negotiating history of the WTO DSU suggests that expansive judicial lawmaking was not a goal
of Uruguay Round negotiators.101 The political history suggests that the main intended function
of WTO dispute settlement was to help ensure the faithful application of the rules agreed upon in
the Uruguay Round negotiations, even if those rules were incomplete, not optimally efficient, or

94

John Ragosta, Navin Joneja, Mikhail Zeldovich, supra note 89, at 703.
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id., at 705.
98
Joost Pauwelyn, The Transformation of World Trade, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 51 (2005).
99
Id., at 52-53.
100
Richard H. Steinberg, supra note 40, at 257.
101
Id., at 250.
95
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considered inequitable.102 To help ensure that the WTO dispute settlement system would not
shift members' rights and responsibilities,103 trade negotiators included a provision in the WTO
DSU to the effect that the Appellate Body “cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations
provided in the covered agreements.”104
Although WTO judicial lawmaking is perhaps more expansive than intended by most
Uruguay negotiators, DSB is still politically constrained in a significant way. However, political
constraints alone do not warrant further judicialization through judicial lawmaking. Appellate
Body members are selected through a process in which powerful members may veto candidates
whom they assess as likely to engage in inappropriate or undesired lawmaking; the Appellate
Body acts in the shadow of threats to rewrite DSU rules that would weaken it and of possible
defiance of its decisions by powerful members; and the Appellate Body receives--and has
established means of obtaining-- information on the preferences of powerful members, helping it
to avoid political pitfalls.105 WTO legal discourse has been applied in a manner that pays
attention to political signals, and the Appellate Body's interpretations are likely to rest within the
interstices of WTO texts.106 Nevertheless, the Appellate should be careful in the way it decides
the disputes. Richard Steinberg suggests that the Appellate Body give greater consideration to
object and purpose, context, and preparatory materials to help determine whether an ambiguity
or gap was deliberately left vague to permit a range of action, and to help interpret it when it was
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not; make greater use of avoidance techniques in cases where an ambiguity or gap cannot be
clearly resolved; treat WTO agreements not as if they have an exclusively liberalizing purpose,
but as contracts that embody both liberal and illiberal purposes; and resist pressure to import
non-WTO public international law into its decisions unless that law is textually linked to a term
in a WTO agreement.107

V.

Conclusion
The Uruguay Round and the DSU created a much more judicialized, rule-based

adjudicative model of international trade dispute settlement process that resembles state litigation
system. Compared to the GATT dispute settlement system, the present system is far more
legalized and fundamentally adjudicative, expressly relying on interpretive rules and principles
set forth in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and sometimes resorting to principles
of public international law that are extrinsic to terms in WTO instruments.108 After the Uruguay
Round, the Appellate Body engaged in further judicailization of the dispute process through
judicial lawmaking. The Appellate Body engages in judicial lawmaking by filling in the
procedural gaps left by the DSU’s silence, giving specific meaning to ambiguous treaty
language, and cumulatively reading language across the GATT/WTO agreements. While further
judicialization might bring some benefits to the international trade system, it can also harm
developing countries that judicialization is meant to help. Further judicialization also lacks
legitimacy, as it violates state sovereignty by creating obligations that they never agreed to and
lacks democratic controls.
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The WTO dispute settlement system stands in a unique place. The member states do not
want a truly independent judiciary that imposes binding judgments.109 The WTO agreements are
a series of contractual arrangement between and among sovereign states, and the states did not
intend to establish a comprehensive legal system with an independent judiciary.110 The current
dispute settlement system was intentionally designed to be a quasi-adjudicative system with
restricted powers, subject ultimately to the control of the WTO members.111 At the same time,
there are strong arguments for making the WTO dispute system more independent and rulebased. Joost Pauwelyn outlines various arguments for judicialization,112
The WTO dispute settlement process, under the constraints of international system and
the current institutional structure that lacks judicial protections and effective democratic controls,
still needs to reform for better procedural protections and due process.113 There are innumerable
procedural improvements that the WTO can make to create a better trade dispute settlement
system. Ragosta et al. suggest mandate to decide actual cases, right of real parties in interest to
participate, need for transparency, real and consistent opportunity for amicus briefing, improving
the rights of least developing countries to effective representation, impartiality of panels, an
independent and sufficiently staffed standing judiciary, publication of dissenting opinions, and
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improving the clarity of panel and Appellate Body reports.114 Adam Chilton and Ryan Davis
suggest informal proceduralist approach that helps to remove the obstacles that developing
countries face in the more judicialized system. They highlight Costa Rica’s path to participation
in the WTO dispute system and argue that “participating in a dispute provides rovides a
‘pathway to experience’ and future participation as a claimant.”115 They propose improving and
expanding the advisory centers, providing financial remedies, and making countermeasures
tradable as egalitarian proposals to reform the WTO.116 However, it is difficult to know what
effects these reforms would have on developing countries and the legitimacy of the institution.
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